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STATUTORY COMMENT
Campus Censorship: Statute Barring Speakers From State
Educational Institutions
I. INTRODUCTION
The last place in a democracy to expect restrictions on the think-
ing process is in a university or college. Yet the censorship of ideas
in such institutions is not rare. A brief exploration of these re-
strictions will put the North Carolina law in sharper focus and
proper perspective.
A. Control of Teachers
The forms of campus censorship are varied. One is the dismissal
of the teacher who espouses the unpopular ideas of the day. In the
decades prior to the Civil War, professors were discharged because
of sentiments for or against slavery. After the Civil War, and even
into the twentieth century, teaching the theory of evolution resulted
in the discharge of many faculty members, particularly in sectarian
schools. In 1896 professors were discharged because they voted
for William Jennings Bryan;1 and in 1900 Professor Edward A.
Ross was dismissed from Stanford University for having advocated
free silver.2 In 1948 Olivet College discharged a professor and the
college librarian because of their "ultra-liberal" views, and over
half the faculty resigned in protest.' In the same year, a professor
of religion was discharged from Evansville College in Indiana for
having served as chairman of a local Wallace-for-President meet-
ing;4 and Oregon State University discharged a chemistry teacher
for "supporting the genetics teachings of Lysenko, the Russian
Communist, who advocates the theory that acquired characteristics
can be inherited."5 In 1949 a New York teacher received dismissal
charges for making anti-Negro statements in her classroom;6 and
more recently professors in southern institutions have been discharged
'CUSHMAN, CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 75-76 (1956).
'EMERSON & HABER, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED
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because of activities and attitudes favoring integration.7  An eco-
nomics professor at West Virginia Wesleyan College just lost his
job, under pressure brought by the state Labor Federation, because
of right-wing teaching ;8 but more common in recent years is dis-
charge on grounds of communism,' pleading the fifth amendment,
10
refusal to take an oath disclaiming membership in "subversive or-
ganizations,"'" or for refusal to give information relating to mem-
bership in the NAACP. 2
B. Control of the Curriculum
Another form of censorship is the requirement that certain sub-
jects be either included in or excluded from the curriculum. The
most notable illustration of exclusion was the prohibition against
the teaching of evolution brought into the limelight by the Scopes
trial where Clarence Darrow and William Jennings Bryan came to
grips. But there are many others. California prohibits any teach-
ing that reflects on specific nationality, color or creed;13 Michigan
outlaws the teaching of birth control ;4 and many states have taken
steps to prohibit the teaching of communism. 5
Required courses and subjects also run a wide gauntlet. Min-
nesota requires that all boys study agriculture and that all girls
study housekeeping.' Texas requires that children be taught
"kindness to animals and the protection of birds and their nests.'
1
Wisconsin demands a "study of the comparative vitamin content
" For a collection of such incidents from Florida to Texas, see Van
Woodward, Unreported Crises in the Southern Colleges, 225 Harper Maga-
zine 82, Oct. 1, 1962.
8 N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1963, p. 51, col. 1.
° See, e.g., Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952), sustaining a
New York law which required the discharge of teachers who teach or ad-
vocate the overthrow of the government by force and violence.
10 See, e.g., Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956) holding
unconstitutional a New York statute which required the discharge of teachers
who invoke the privilege against self-incrimination.
" See, e.g., Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952), holding un-
constitutional an Oklahoma statute requiring such an oath.
1 See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), holding unconstitu-
tional an Arkansas law requiring such disclosure.
18 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 8251 (1960).
Micn. Comr. LAws § 370.2 (1948).
18 Seitz, Supervision of Public Elementary and Secondary School Pupils
Through State Control over Curriculum and Textbook Selection, 20 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 104, 111-113 (1955).
" Associated Schools v. School Dist. No. 83, 122 Minn. 254, 142 N.W.
325 (1913).
17TEx. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2911 (1951).
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and food and health values of dairy products."" Most commonly,
however, states require instruction in the United States Constitu-
tion, in American history, in civics, in citizenship, and in driver
safety education. 9
The Supreme Court has not had many occasions to rule on these
matters 20 but when it has spoken, it has spoken decisively:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation,
it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an except-
tion, they do not now occur to us.
2 1
C. Control of Text Books
A third form of censorship takes place when certain books are
outlawed. Many famous writers-Upton Sinclair, John Dos
Passos, even Ibsen-have found that their best works could not be
read or produced on college campuses. In 1948 a magazine The
Nation was suspended from New York public school libraries for
having carried a series of articles highly critical of the Catholic
church.2 ' The magazine was removed as a result of protests from
Catholic parents; and shortly thereafter several Jewish organiza-
tions protested the use of Dickens' Oliver Twist and Shakespeare's
The Merchant of Venice as approved reading and study material.23
In Sapulpa, Oklahoma, five or six books were taken from the school
library and actually burned because they had been criticized by a
women's civic group for their attitude toward socialism and sex.2a
Certain films, notably those relating to the San Francisco hearings
of the Un-American Activities Committee, and even pictures have
8 Wis. STAT. §40.46(9) (1953).
'o Seitz, supra note 15, at 105.20West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
(held state's requirement that school children salute the American flag
unconstitutional) ; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (held
prohibition of attendance of private school offering instruction in religious
creed unconstitutional); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (held
state's ban on instruction in the German language unconstitutional)." West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, supra note 20, at 642.
22 See Comment, School Boards, Schoolbooks, and the Freedom to Learn,
59 YALE L.J. 928, 933-34 (1950).
"A suit to compel removal of these books was dismissed. Rosenberg
v. Board of Educ., 196 Misc. 542, 92 N.Y.S.2d 344 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
28a EMERSON & HABER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 830-31.
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been banned from college campuses .2  Texas has a law requiring
a loyalty oath from all authors whose books are used by the schools
within the state ;25 Colorado26 and Wyoming2 T have constitutional
provisions preventing any state authority from exercising any con-
trol over the selection of text books-thus removing the issue from
the political forum and putting it in the hands of the educators.
D. Control of Outside Speakers
An additional form of censorship is to deny students and faculty
the opportunity to hear certain types of "outside speakers." Again
this is nothing new. In the mid 1940's Howard Fast, the writer,
was one of the many "contempt of Congress" persons who was
denied permission to speak on the campus of New York University
and elsewhere.2 In 1951 a Quaker pacifist was denied permission
to speak on the campus at Ohio State University."' In 1955 the
president at the University of Washington refused to allow Robert
Oppenheimer (the father of the atomic bomb) to address a con-
ference of scientists on his campus."0 The roll-call is a long one.
Within the past year, Malcolm X, the Black Muslim, was denied
access to campuses at the University of California and Queens
College3 Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. was denied an invitation
to participate in a seminar relating religion to major current issues
at Washington and Lee.3 Raul Roa, Jr., a Cuban representative
at the United Nations was denied an invitation by a student group
at the City College of New York. 3 Wayne State University banned
Harvey O'Connor, the author.3 4 Lehigh University banned Nor-
2" Five paintings by Mississippi art instructor G. Ray Kerciu were re-
moved from a campus art exhibit because they discredited the student resist-
ance to the admission of Negro James Meredith at that institution. This
breach of academic freedom triggered the decision by many of the more than
a third of the tenured faculty which left the University of Mississippi after a
year of rioting and turmoil. Durham Morning Herald, May 17, 1963, § C,
p. 12, col. 1.25 TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-7 (1962).
28 COLO. CONST. art. 16, § 9.
" WYo. CONST. art. 7, § 2.
2 EMERSON & HABER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 833.
2 Id. at 832.
20 CUSHMAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 85.
2 1 NEW YORK COUNTY LAWYERS Ass'N COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, A RE-






man Thomas, the former Socialist candidate for President. 5  Yale
University originally overrode a student invitation to Alabama's
Governor George C. Wallace, 6 but on reconsideration, reluctantly
rescinded the ban."7 A recent round-up article in the St. Paul
Pioneer Press3" reports that state-supported institutions with clearly
enunciated bans on Communists include the University of Illinois,
Ohio State University, Indiana University, and the University of
Washington. The list of major universities which clearly permit
Communists or other known subversives to speak is a distinguished
one, including California, Minnesota,. Michigan State, Wisconsin,
Iowa, Pennsylvania State, Oregon, Colorado, and the City College of
New York among the state universities and Chicago, Stanford,
Cornell, Princeton, Columbia, and Harvard among the private insti-
tutions.3 9 Some years ago when there was criticism of an appear-
ance at Harvard by Communist Gerhart Eisler, a Harvard official
commented: "If Harvard students can be corrupted by an Eisler,
Harvard college had better shut down as an educational insti-
tution."'40
II. NORTH CAROLINA LAWS
A. The 1941 North Carolina Law
In 1941 North Carolina imposed its first ban on campus
speakers. The legislature in that year made it unlawful for any
public building in the state, including campus buildings at colleges
supported in whole or in part by state funds, "to be used by any
persons for the purpose of advocating, advising or teaching a doc-
trine that the Government of the United States, the State of North
Carolina or any political subdivision thereof should be overthrown
by force, violence or any other unlawful means."41
This 1941 law would run afoul of the constitutionally guaranteed
freedom of speech if applied to "penalize the utterance or publica-
tion of abstract 'doctrine' or academic discussion having no quality
of incitement to any concrete action."4 Freedom to speak includes
'Ibid.
,' N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1963, p. 29, col. 3.
:"N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1963, p. 30, col. 6.
8' St. Paul Pioneer Press, July 7, 1963, p. 1, col. 4.
:" Ibid.
" Ibid.
"1 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-11 (1953).
" Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 664 (1925).
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freedom of "advocacy in the realm of ideas. 43 The Supreme Court
has held in a case involving California leaders of the Communist
Party-brought to trial under the Smith Act13, which is identical in
pertinent terms to the 1941 North Carolina statute-that "advocacy
of forcible overthrow as mere abstract doctrine is within the free
speech protection of the First Amendment."44  It is only when the
advocacy of ideas is coupled with an "effort to instigate action to
that end";45 it is only when the speech advocates "action, not
ideas" ;46 it is only when the speech is "inciting" in the sense that
it is "calculated to induce immediate action ' '4T that the speaker can
be punished because of his words. In short, the free speech pro-
visions of the Constitution prevent North Carolina from applying
this 1941 statute so as to penalize a campus speaker who does
nothing more than present an academic discussion on the in-
evitability of violent revolution. If, however, the campus speaker
exhorts the audience to organize into secret cells, and prepare for
the signal to strike, there is nothing in the Constitution which
prevents North Carolina from enforcing the 1941 statute.48
B. The 1963 North Carolina Law
In the closing days of the 1963 legislative session, the general
assembly enacted a second law imposing limitations on campus
speakers. It is very short and provides as follows:
No college or university which receives any State funds in
support thereof, shall permit any person to use the facilities of
such college or university for speaking purposes, who:
(1) Is a known member of the Communist Party;
(2) Is known to advocate the overthrow of the Constitution
of the United States or the State of North Carolina;
(3) Has pleaded the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution
of the United States in refusing to answer any question with
respect to Communist or subversive connections, or activities,
before any duly constituted legislative committee, any judicial
tribunal, or any executive or administrative board of the United
States or any state.
48 a
" Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 518 (1951).
"3 18 U.S.C. §§ 9-11 (1958).




48 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116-119 (Supp. 1963).
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This article shall be enforced by the board of trustees, or other
governing authority, of such college or university, or by such
administrative personnel as may be appointed therefor by the
board of trustees or other governing authority of such college
or university.
49
The Bill was enacted into law with almost no debate. Indeed,
the Greensboro Daily News commented editorially: "The opposi-
tion was not informed of the bill's existence. In the House there
was no debate; and in the Senate . .. presiding officer Clarence
Stone . . . shouted objectors down and cut them off without the
minor courtesy of a record vote.""0  The Raleigh News and Ob-
server51 explained that the sponsors patterned the law after a bill
pending in the Ohio Legislature, a bill which, as finally enacted in
Ohio, merely confirmed the authority of university officials in that
state to ban objectionable campus speakers.
Although the state newspapers had no opportunity for advance
comment, they were, almost without exception, extremely critical
after the event.5 2 The editorial writers were dealing with the
'° N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116-200 (Supp. 1963).
co Greensboro Daily News, June 27, 1963, p. 8, col. 1.
"lJune 29, 1963, p. 1, col. 6.
" The Raleigh News and Observer called the bill a "Throwback to
McCarthyism" and n6ted that "the University of California, prior to enact-
ment of the North, Carolina law, was the only major university in the
country with such a restriction in effect. And while North Carolina's Legis-
lature was enacting its ban on Communist speakers, the California institu-
tion was rescinding a similar ban put into effect on all that institution's
campuses during the McCarthy era." June 29, 1963, p. 24, col. 2. The
Greensboro Record made a similar observation, noting that New York had
dropped its ban two years earlier. June 29, 1963, § A, p. 12, col. 1. The
Winston-Salem Journal called the law "fear inspired" and said: "In a letter
to prospective members of the faculty of the University of Virginia, Thomas
Jefferson wrote nearly 200 years ago: 'This institution will be based on the
illimitable freedom of the human mind. For here we are not afraid to
follow truth, wherever it may lead, nor to tolerate error so long as reason
is left free to combat it.' The North Carolina General Assembly, many of
whose members profess to be Jeffersonian Democrats, demonstrated this
week that it is afraid to tolerate error in colleges supported by this state
even though reason is free to combat it." June 27, 1963. The Charlotte
Observer wrote: "But the provision which bans 'Fifth Amendment' speakers
is by far the saddest part of the law. Aside from the ironical fact that
this law shows disrespect for the ancient Anglo-American premise that .a
man need not testify against himself, and shows disdain for the very
Constitution which it professes to protect, the law would, for example,
prevent Arthur Miller, a noted American playwright, from lecturing on
drama at Chapel Hill." June 27, 1963, § B, p. 2, col. 1. The Fayetteville
Observer made a similar comment: "So if a distinguished Russian surgeon
who has devised a new type of kidney operation wants to show it to pro-
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wisdom and propriety of the act. It is the purpose of this article
to review some of the constitutional issues at hand.
The 1941 statute prohibited the use of campus facilities by
speakers for the purpose of advocating the overthrow of the national
and state government by force, violence or any other unlawful
means. The 1963 statute is different. It prohibits the use of
campus facilities by speakers, no matter what the subject on the
agenda, if they fall within certain categories: known members of the
Communist Party; persons known to advocate the overthrow of the
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of North Caro-
lina; and persons who have pleaded the fifth amendment of the
Constitution of the United States in refusing to answer questions
with respect to communist or subversive connections or activities. 5
This statute raises serious problems under the constitutional
guarantee of free speech, under the constitutional guarantee against
self-incrimination, and, because of its vague and nebulous terms,
under the due process clauses of the Constitution.
1. Problems Under the First Amendment Free Speech Provision.
-The first amendment to the Constitution provides that "Congress
shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech .... ." This
constitutional prohibition against Congress (and the federal gov-
ernment generally) has been incorporated into the fourteenth
amendment's prohibition against the states,54 thereby making it
unconstitutional for the state or its agents to "abridge the freedom
of speech."55
Long ago the Supreme Court made it clear that a state could
not punish a known communist for speaking at a communist party
meeting when the subject matter of the speech was lawful and legiti-
fessors at the University of North Carolina Medical School, he has to do
it by sign language, or else invite them all over to the operating room
at Duke Hospital." June 20, 1963. The Sanford Herald did not wish to
see an infringement on the right of free speech guaranteed by the United
States Constitution. June 28, 1963. The Durham Morning Herald said it
was a "bad parting shot by the assembly." June 27, 1963; and the Raleigh
Times said: "We cannot afford to have a state which teaches young people
that they must let fear rule their lives, instead of letting hope and courage
and willingness to delve into the four corners of the world of education rule
their lives." The preceding editorial comments are duplicated in Editorial
Comment on House Bill 1395 (University News Bureau, Chapel Hill, N.C.,
1963).
See notes 48a, 49 supra and accompanying text.
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
SCf. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
[Vol. 42
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mate. 6 De Jonge, a leading member of the Oregon Communist
Party, spoke at a party meeting on problems arising out of a current
water-front strike. He was indicted and convicted in the state courts
under a "sedition" law similar to the 1941 North Carolina statute. 7
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction as a violation of
first amendment rights and made it clear that in our society a person
cannot be punished or deprived of speaking privileges on the basis
of his associations and sympathies, but only because of some concrete
personal involvement in criminal conduct. The Supreme Court,
in an opinion by Chief Justice Hughes, said:
The question, if the rights of free speech and peaceable as-
sembly are to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which
the meeting is held but as to its purpose; not as to the relations
of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds
of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects. If the
persons assembling have committed crimes elsewhere, if they have
formed or are engaged in a conspiracy against the public peace
and order, they may be prosecuted for their conspiracy or other
violation of valid laws. But it is a different matter when the
State, instead of prosecuting them for such offenses, seizes upon
mere participation in a peaceable assembly and a lawful public
discussion as the basis for a criminal charge.58
This clear and present danger test-that a man can be con-
victed for what he says in certain circumstances but never for what
he is-has applicability not only in a state criminal prosecution, but
also when speech is abridged by the denial of a public forum.
This is true, for example, when the state denies use of the city
streets for a parade" or denies use of the city parks for a meeting.6"
In Rockwell v. Morris,"' the New York court ordered the New
York Park Commissioner to permit a self-styled Nazi the use of
Union Square for a fourth of July speech, and held:
Only if Rockwell speaks criminally,. . . can his right to speak
be cut off. If he does not speak criminally, then, of course, his
right to speak may not be cut off, no matter how offensive his
speech may be to others. Instead, his right, and that of those
' De jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
"See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365-66 (1937).
"Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
"Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
1211 N.Y.S.2d 25, appeal dismissed, 9 N.Y.2d 791, 175 N.E.2d 162
(1961).
19631
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who wish to listen to him, must be protected, no matter how
unpleasant the assignment.
6 2
The courts do not recognize a constitutional distinction between
denying unpopular speakers use of a public park or denying them
use of a public school building. Each denial infringes upon freedom
of first amendment rights of expression.
The Supreme Court of the United States has never passed upon
the issue,6 3 but the state courts are well-neigh unanimous in this
view.
The first such decision arose in California. In Danskin v.
San Diego Unified School Dist.,64 California enacted a statute
authorizing public use of school auditoriums when not used for
school purposes unless the applicant was a member of a group
having as its object or one of its objects the overthrow of the
government by force, violence, or other unlawful means. Danskin
was denied the use of the school civic center in San Diego because
he refused to file an affidavit that he was not a member of such a
proscribed organization. He turned to the courts for relief, and the
Supreme Court of California ordered that he be permitted to use
the school building. The court, in an extended and oft-cited opinion,
held that "however reprehensible a Legislature may regard certain
convictions or affiliations, it cannot forbid them if they present no
'clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive
evils' that the Legislature has a right to prevent."6  Here, where
there was no evidence that the school forum would be used to incite
illegal action, the court said that: "The convictions or affiliations of
one who requests the use of a school building as a forum is of no
more concern to the school administrators than to a superintendent
of parks or streets if the forum is the green or the market place,"0 0
and that "It is not for the state to control the influence of a public
forum by censoring the ideas, the proponents, or the audience.
6 7
The court believed that the denial of a forum here was analogous
to the situation before the Supreme Court of the United States in the
De Jonge case because: "In each case the state sought to suppress
62 211 N.Y.S.2d at 36.
"Ellis v. Dixon, 349 U.S. 485 (1955) (noted by Court in refusing to
decide issue).
O, 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946).
65 Id. at 542, 171 P.2d at 889.
60 Id. at 547, 171 P.2d at 892.
67 Id. at 548, 171 P.2d at 893.
[Vol. 42
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free speech and assembly and it is immaterial that it sought to
accomplish that objective in the one case by threat of punishment
and in the other by censorship."6  Finally, the court noted that the
state is under no duty to make school buildings available for public
meetings; but if it elects to do so, it cannot use this power in a partisan
manner. "Since the state cannot compel 'subversive elements' di-
rectly to renounce their convictions and affiliations, it cannot make
such a renunciation a condition of receiving the privilege of free
assembly in a school building."69
Thereafter, the California legislature amended its law to make
it unlawful for any organization to use the public school facilities
for the commission of any act intended to further any program or
movement the purpose of which is to accomplish the overthrow of
the Government of the United States or of the state by force,
violence, or other unlawful means. A disclaimer affidavit was
required as a condition precedent for use of the school facilities.
The California Supreme Court held that this is "exactly the type
of regulation held unconstitutional by us in Danskin and by the
United States Supreme Court in De Jonge .. .
The California school authorities then enacted regulations re-
quiring applicants for the use of a school auditorium to swear that
the building will not be used for the commission of any act which
is prohibited by law. The California Supreme Court said that
this requirement was valid because it does not require an applicant:
To divulge its political, sociological or economic beliefs. Neither
does it require an applicant to set forth its general purposes, its
associations, or anything about itself save and except the use to
Id. at 553, 171 P.2d at 896.
Id. at 546, 171 P.2d at 891.
"American Civil Liberties Union v. Board of Educ., 10 Cal. Rptr. 647,
651, 359 P.2d 45, 49 (1961). The court said: "Upon a finding that the
school's 'civic center' will be used 'for the commission of any act intended
to further . . . the overthrow of the Government . . .' the school board is
empowered to deny the use of the center in advance. This amounts to a
censorship in advance of the right of assembly and free speech upon a
mere determination of a probability of its future misuse. Prior censorship
upon such a prophetic finding can certainly only be justified, if at all, upon
the clearest sort of showing that such misuse will with reasonable certainty
occur .... The danger of censorship in advance is that, in attempting to
prevent the commission of forbidden acts in advance, it will also prevent
lawful assemblies and the lawful exercise of free speech upon an erroneous
(even if plausible) finding in advance that the applicant intends to engage
in unlawful assembly and unlawful'speech ... ." Id. at 653-53, 359 P.2d at
51-2.
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which it intends to put the school property-and even in that
regard it makes no distinction between prospective uses so long
as they are within the law.7 1
The California court explained that its earlier decisions were based
upon different types of laws, "laws which denied the use of school
property because of the applicant's political belief, not because of
the use to which it intended to put the premises."72
The New York courts first met the same problem when Hunter
College denied the use of its facilities to the right-wing magazine
National Review. Since 1954, the National Review had rented
annually the facilities of Hunter College for lectures. On December
1, 1960, the Review sponsored a lecture by Jacques Soustelle, one
of the leaders of the French rightest movement aimed at keeping
Algeria French. The meeting had aroused great controversy, and
it had been picketed. Thereafter the Review was informed that
it could no longer lease the Hunter College auditorium. The
Review brought suit and the court ruled for William Buckley, the
editor of the Review, stating:
Courage is the secret of liberty and therefore timidity on the
part of its officials in the face of heretical or controversial ideas
cannot be tolerated in a democratic society. When such timidity
is embodied in an official regulation governing the use of school
buildings, it must be struck down .as violative of the First
Amendment to our Federal Constitution .... 73
The Court further said:
The principle of these cases is the- simple one that what the
state cannot do directly it may not do indirectly. Since there is
no power in the state to stifle minority opinion directly by forbid-
ding its expression, it may not accomplish this same purpose
by allowing its facilities to be used by proponents of majority
opinion while denying them to dissenters.7sa
Shortly thereafter, however, a different New York trial judge
74
reached a different result. The University of Buffalo (part of the
state university system) students invited one Herbert Aptheker, a
7'American Civil Liberties Union v. Board of Educ., 28 Cal. Rptr. 700,
706-07, 379 P.2d 4, 11 (1963).
" Id. at 4, 379 P.2d at 7.
7 Buckley v. Meng, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924, 926 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
5"a Id. at 934.
"' In New York, the trial court is called the Supreme Court even thougli
appeals can be taken to two different "higher" state courts.
[Vol. 42
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ranking member of the Communist Party, to speak onl the campus
concerning the nature of communism. A tax-payer named Egan
filed suit against the trustees to compel them to withhold use of the
school facilities. The trial court ruled against the speech, taking
judicial notice that membership in the Communist Party auto-
matically entails advocacy of the overthrow of our government by
force and violence, and that the right of free speech ceases at the
point where it leads to harm to the government. 5
This point of views stands alone among court opinions and has
been rebutted by one legal commentator as follows:
[N]ot all action urged by Communists can be punished.
Communists on occasion advocate legislative nationalization
of industry, or executive recognition of Communist China.
Speeches urging these objectives cannot be prevented merely
because they are delivered by individuals who also harbor the
view-but not then expressed-that violent revolution is de-
sirable .... A ban directed at the speaker rather than at the
course of conduct urged on a particular occasion goes too far.
It ignores not only the nature of the action to be urged, but also
the "probability" requirement of the Supreme Court [clear and
present danger] test. Even if a proposed speech would urge
unlawful action, circumstances may be such that the audience
is highly unlikely to respond favorably. A remote tendency
to incite unlawful action is not enough to justify suppression.
To illustrate the foregoing proposition, suppose a recognized
student group were to invite the Soviet Ambassador to address
them on "The Meaning of the Treaty of Antarctica in Soviet-
American Relations." Unless it could be demonstrated that the
Ambassador would depart from the chosen subject to move his
audience to unlawful action, which is highly unlikely, a state
university could not bar him from its campus consistently with
any current interpretation of the fourteenth amendment.76
2. Problems Under the "Due Process Clause."-Tle due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments import the doctrine
that a criminal statute must be sufficiently clear so that persons of
common intelligence may know whether they, or their activities,
come within its scope. A crime is not to be defined in such gen-
"eril, ambiguous, or conflicting terms that "men of common in-
telligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
" Egan v. Moore, 235 N.Y.S.2d 995 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1962).
"'Van Alstyne, Political Speakers at State Universities, 111 U. PA. L.
REv. 328, 335 (1963).
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application . . . . No one may be required at peril of life, liberty,
or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes."
77
"Words which are vague and fluid... may be as much of a trap
for the innocent as the ancient laws of Caligula. 78  The vice of
unconstitutional vagueness is further aggravated where, as here,
the statute in question operates to inhibit the exercise of speech.
Just as a statute authorizing prior restraint will violate constitutional
rights of speech in that the advance attempt to prevent unlawful
speech will also prevent lawful speech upon an erroneous prophecy
that the would-be speaker intends to engage in unlawful incitement,
so also a penal statute couched in vague terms violates freedom of
speech in that persons attempting to comply will err on the side of
caution and hence forgo lawful rights.70
This "vice of vagueness" doctrine has been applied to teacher's
oaths8" and to situations wherein school facilities were denied to
unpopular speakers."' For example, in the Bueckley case82 Hunter
College regulations permitted the use of the school auditorium by
outside organizations only if the programs "are determined to be
compatible with the aims of Hunter College as a public institution of
higher learning. ' 's a The Court held that this standard was so vague
as to invite discriminatory and arbitrary regulation."'
It is apparent from reading the 1963 North Carolina statute
that reasonable men will differ as to the scope of its intended
application.
77Lanzatta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).
" United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174, 176 (1952).
" Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959)." Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961).
81 Buckley v. Meng, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
82 Ibid.
1"1Id. at 930.
88 "In the first place, the regulation . . . expressly provides that in order
to qualify, a program must be 'determined to be compatible' with the aim of
Hunter College .... Who is empowered to make such a determination?
And by what standards? In effect, whether a program is permissible or not
rests on the untrammeled discretion of some official. In the second place ...
I cannot state with any precision what the aims of Hunter College . . . are
... I would have thought that one of the aims of a college worthy of the
name was to stimulate thought and to provoke intellectual controversy ...
'Consistency with the aims of the college' is not a sufficiently clear stand-
ard by which to determine who shall use the college's facilities because
reasonable men can and do differ as to what these aims are. As long
as it is possible for reasonable men to differ as to what a given standard
means, that standard cannot properly serve as the basis for a limitation on
First Amendment rights." Ibid.
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The North Carolina statute prohibits the use of college "facili-
ties." What is a facility? An editorial in the Fayetteville Observer
expressed the problem this way:
[Ijf some crackpot or political reprobate, who happens to hold
a seat in Congress, gets you called before an investigating com-
mittee and insultingly asks you if you have ever been a mem-
ber of the Communist Party, and you tell him to go jump in
the lake that you will not dignify that question with an answer,
then you've got to wear a gag in your mouth every time you go
to a Duke-Carolina game at Chapel Hill. On penalty of arrest
you are forbidden either to cheer or cuss the coach.84
The Raleigh News and Observer85 reminds us that the Tobacco
Associates recently conducted a group of Russian farmers-Com-
munists all-to North Carolina experimental farms. Is a college-
owned farm a college "facility" within the meaning of the statute?
More importantly, are college stadiums and college farms so clearly
college "facilities," or so clearly not college "facilities," that reason-
able men will not differ? Is Kenan Stadium a "facility" on Mon-
day mornings when it is used by distinguished visiting speakers but
not on Saturday afternoons when Carolina plays host to visiting
football teams? If there is no single clear understanding, the
statute is unconstitutional for this reason alone.
The 1963 statute makes it illegal to use college facilities for
"speaking purposes." The News and Observer further reminds us
that:
Last fall 12,000 appreciative people crowded the Reynolds
Coliseum to listen . . . to the Leningrad Symphony Orchestra.
At the end of the concert the conductor--obviously, undoubtedly
and admittedly a Communist-stepped forward and addressed
the audience. He only spoke the pleasure of himself and his
associates in playing for the big company, but he spoke on the
campus of a State-supported institution of higher learning.,6
Is this now illegal under the act? Suppose the conductor refuses
to acknowledge the applause with a few polite words, is the concert
then safe on the theory that performance of music is not "speak-
ing"? Suppose, instead of an orchestra, it is a folk-singer. Can he
say what he wants without violating the act as long as he keeps
Fayetteville Observer, June 30, 1963, § D, p. 4, col. 1.
BS August 27, 1963, duplicated in Editorial Comment on House Bill 1395
(University News Bureau, Chapel Hill, N.C., 1963).
86 Ibid.
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strumming his banjo? Is the Ballet Russe any less'expressive than
the Cossack Chorus? Do these dancing and singing organizations
utilize the campus facilities for "speaking purposes" when they
perform? Suppose a visiting Russian surgeon mentioned by the
Fayetteville 0 bserver 7 did explain his new kidney operation in
sign language. Would that save him from violating the act?
Reasonable persons would certainly differ on the application of the
statute in these situations.
The statute makes it unlawful for university facilities to be
made available for speaking purposes to "a known member of the
Communist Party." Known to whom, with what degree of validity,
and by what means? Is hearsay rumor sufficient if it comes to the
attention of a University official? The Greensboro Daily News
asks if the ban will "extend to those who have been accused before
congressional committees or other government boards of being
Communists, but who have never had their status clarified in a
court.""8  Is the limitation imposed on members of the Russian
Communist Party, or just on members of the Communist Party,
U.S.A.? Does the statute import the distinction long drawn by the
United States Congress and the Supreme Court between membership
in the Communist Party which is "active" and membership which
is "nominal, passive, inactive or purely technical" ?8'
An earlier and analogous situation arose when the Supreme
Court ruled that a New Jersey statute which made it unlawful to
be a "known member of a gang" was unconstitutionally vague. 0
In an opinion by Mr. Justice Butler the Court said:
The enactment employs the expression "known to be a member."
It is ambiguous. There immediately arises the doubt whether
actual or putative association is meant. If actual membership
is required, that status must be established as a fact, and the
word "known" would be without significance. If reputed mem-
bership is enough, there is uncertainty whether that reputation
must be general or extend only to some persons. And the statute
fails to indicate what constitutes membership or how one may
join a "gang." 91
8 See note 52 supra.
8' Greensboro Daily- News, June 29, 1963, p. 4, col. 1.
Compare Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961), with Noto v.
United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961).
" Lanzatta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
91 Id. at 45 8.
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The North Carolina statute requires denial of university facilities
to speakers "known to advocate the overthrow of the Constitution of
the United States or the state of North Carolina."
This section suffers from the same constitutional infirmities as
the previous section, plus many more. "Known to whom" is the
first question that comes to mind. Must the knowledge "be general
or extend only to some persons"? Is the verb "advocate" intended
to convey unlawful, or lawful, advocacy? And what is meant by
the "overthrow" of the Constitution of the United States or the
Constitution of the State of North Carolina? Is violence necessary,
or is it possible to violate the statute by advocacy of sweeping
constitutional reform? If the latter is included, then the statute is
clearly bad under the constitution.
In Schneidernan v. United States 2 the Supreme Court held
that a known leading Communist could be "attached to the principles
of the Constitutione ' 2a within the meaning of the denaturalization
statute because:
The constitutional fathers, fresh from a revolution, did not forge
a political strait-jacket for generations to come. Instead they
wrote Article V, and the First Amendment guaranteeing freedom
of thought, soon followed. Article V contains procedural pro-
visions for constitutional change by amendment without any
present limitation whatsoever except that no State may be de-
prived of equal representation in the Senate without its con-
sent. . . . This provision and the many important and far-
reaching changes made in the Constitution since 1787 refute the
idea that one who advocates radical changes is necessarily not
attached to the Constitution. .... 93
We should not hold that petitioner is not attached to the
Constitution by reason of his possible belief in the creation
of some form of world union of soviet republics unless we are
willing so to hold with regard to those who believe in Pan-
Americanism, the League of Nations, Union Now, or some
other form of international collaboration or collective security
which may grow out of the present holocaust. A distinction
here would be an invidious one based on the fact that we might
agree with or tolerate the latter but dislike or disagree with the
former.98a
" 320 U.S. 118 (1943).
O2 Id. at 138.
"Id. at 137.
I d. at 145-46.
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The point is that if Communists like Schneiderman can be
"attached to the Constitution" within the meaning of the federal
law, what is prohibited by the term "advocate the overthrow of the
Constitution" as used in the North Carolina law? Does it include
Malcolm X, the Black Muslim leader who advocates a "Black Re-
public"? Does it include Governor Wallace of Alabama, or Gov-
ernor Barnett of Mississippi, because of their armed interference
with federal court orders? Obviously, reasonable men would differ
on these questions; and "as long as it is possible for reasonable
men to differ as to what a given standard means, that standard
cannot properly serve as a basis for a limitation on First Amendment
rights."94
The statute requires denial of university facilities for speaking
purposes to a person who has pleaded the fifth amendment of the
Constitution with respect to "Communist or subversive connections,
or activities." This is vagueness with a vengeance. "Communist
connections" mean something different from Communist member-
ship, but what? "Communist connections" mean something differ-
ent from "subversive connections," but what? "Communist or
subversive connections" mean something different from communist
or subversive activities, but what? The statute leaves everyone-
the district attorney, the jury, the judge, the accused-free to
speculate and read their own personal views into the law. In similar
situations, the federal courts have held that the phrase "sympathizer
and promoter of Communism and Communist interests" is void for
vagueness 5 and that the phrase "Un-American propaganda . . .
[which] attacks the principle of the form of government as guaran-
teed by our Constitution" also suffers the "vice of vagueness."9 0
Under these decisions, so does the 1963 North Carolina statute.
3. Problems Under the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Federal
Constitution.-The 1963 statute is constitutionally suspect for yet
another reason. As the Durham Morning Herald editorialized:
By automatically making anyone who has ever invoked the Fifth
Amendment suspect as a subversive, Tarheel representatives
(most of them lawyers) have further downgraded a fundamental
Buckley v. Meng, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924, 930 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
United States v. Lattimore, 215 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
" Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 202 (1957).
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right that they, more than anyone else, should recognize as one
of this country's greatest safeguards of individual liberty.97
The fifth amendment expressly provides that "no person . . . shall
be compelled . . . to be a witness against himself." When a state
seeks to compel a person to be a witness against himself by denying
rights otherwise available, the state is seeking to amend the Consti-
tution, and in a fashion not contemplated by its framers. From
Gibbons v. Ogden98 to the most recent term,99 the Supreme Court
has said time and again that "the laws of the State... must yield"' 0
when incompatible with rights, privileges or immunities granted by
federal law.
The constitutional power of the states, and of Congress, to
"down-grade" and penalize the use of the fifth amendment has
been before the state and federal courts in various contexts in recent
years.
When an obligation to answer questions arises because of the
relationship existing between the questioner and the questioned, the
respondent cannot evade his duty to make reply by invoking the fifth
amendment.' 0 ' Thus, when an attorney is asked questions by a
proper authority regarding professional conduct in connection
with "ambulance chasing," he can be disbarred for refusal to answer
and "a different constitutional conclusion does not result from the
fact that petitioner's refusal was based on a good-faith assertion
of his state privilege against self-incrimination."'0 2 A public school
teacher has an obligation to answer relevant questions asked by
the school principal and cannot escape the punishment otherwise
due merely by the device of invoking the fifth amendment. 0 3 Simi-
larly, when a person is entitled to a governmental favor only by
proving that he is fit or comes within the class of persons entitled
to that favor, it is not unconstitutional for the government to deny
the favor sought when the applicant's failure to prove his case
rests upon his invocation of the fifth amendment when asked perti-
nent questions. 0 4
"' Durham Morning Herald, June 27, 1963, duplicated in Editorial Com-
ment on House Bill 1395 (University News Bureau, Chapel Hill, N.C., 1963)."822 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
" Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379 (1963).100 Id. at 384.
101 Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961).
102 Id. at 125.
'xo Beilen v. Board of Pub. Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958).
.0. Kimm v. Rosenberg, 363 U.S. 405 (1960), in which the Court sus-
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However, when Congress or a state seeks to penalize the proper
use of the fifth amendment by denying the witness a right or privi-
lege otherwise available, the courts, both federal and state, step in
to protest. This is true when the issue involved is the right to
unemployment compensation,10 5 the right to a retirement annuity
for past federal employment service,10 the right to practice law,
10 7
the right while on the witness stand to be free from questions re-
lating to past pleas of the fifth amendment,'08 and the right to serve
as an instructor at a state university 0 9 About this last right the
Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Tom Clark, made
the following comment:
At the outset we must condemn the practice of imputing a sin-
ister meaning to the exercise of a person's constitutional right
under the Fifth Amendment ....
With this in mind, we consider the application of Sec. 903
[of the New York City Charter]. As interpreted and applied
by the state courts, it operates to discharge every city employee
who invokes the Fifth Amendment. In practical effect the
questions asked are taken as confessed and made the basis
of the discharge .... The heavy hand of the statute falls alike
on all who exercise their constitutional privilege, the full enjoy-
ment of which every person is entitled to receive. Such action
falls squarely within the prohibition of Wiernan v. Updegraff
[Constitutional protection does extend to the public servant
whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or
discriminatory]." 0
III. CONCLUSION
In 1954 one Paul Sweezy was subpoened before a New Hamp-
shire congressional committee investigating "subversive persons"
and asked questions about a lecture he had given as a visiting
speaker to a humanities class at the University of New Hampshire.
Mr. Sweezy refused to answer these questions on the grounds that
they violated academic freedom and first amendment privileges. The
tained the denial of an alien's application to suspend a lawful order of
deportation when denial was based on plea of fifth amendment to questions
relating to applicant's moral character.
1 ' Darwin v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 188 Pa.
Super. 282, 146 A.2d 740 (1960).
100 Steinberg v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 590 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
107 Sheiner v. State, 82 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1955).
108 Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957).




New Hampshire courts over-ruled these objections and ordered that
he be punished for "contempt.""'  The United States Supreme
Court reviewed the case and reversed the conviction. In the opinion
of the Court, written by Mr. Chief Justice Warren, the following
basic principle is stated:
We believe that there unquestionably was an invasion of
petitioner's liberties in the areas of academic freedom and po-
litical expression-areas in which government should be ex-
tremely reticent to tread.
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American
universities is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate
the vital role in a democracy that is played by those who guide
and train our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the in-
tellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil
the future of our Nation. No field of education is so thoroughly
comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made.
Particularly is that true in the social sciences, where few, if any
principles are accepted as absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish
in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and stu-
dents must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evalu-
ate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our
civilization will stagnate and die.
112
In 1963, the New York Times praised the decision of California
to rescind the twelve year old ban on Communist speakers at the
University as "a vote of confidence in the judgment of the student
body."' 3 The Times remarked that:
Universities are not designed to shelter students from ideas
but to expose them to clashing viewpoints under circumstances
that will help them make reasoned evaluations of what is sound
and what is false in each....
New York's City University showed similar respect for the
validity of the educational process in December, 1961, when its
administrative council withdrew an ill-considered rule against
Communist speakers on its college campuses. The best way to
build appreciation of democratic traditions in our colleges is,
as we have often observed, to practice them unreservedly."14
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